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Abstract—Networks-of-networks (NoN) is a graph-theoretic
model of interdependent networks that have distinct dynamics
at each network (layer). By adding special edges to represent
relationships between nodes in different layers, NoN provides a
unified mechanism to study interdependent systems intertwined
in a complex relationship. While NoN based models have been
proposed for cyber-physical systems, in this position paper we
build towards a three-layered NoN model for an enterprise
cyber system. Each layer captures a different facet of a cyber
system. We present in-depth discussion for four major graph-
theoretic applications to demonstrate how the three-layered
NoN model can be leveraged for continuous system monitoring
and mission assurance.
Keywords-Cyber security; graph theory; networks of net-
works
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber security is a tremendous challenge facing not
only individual corporations but also nations around the
world. The social and economic impact from a systematic
cyber attack is potentially devastating for an organization.
Understanding and overcoming the vulnerabilities of an
enterprise cyber system is therefore critical to continued
operation of an organization. However, cyber systems are
complex in nature and hard to model in a uniform setting.
A graph G = (V,E) is an ordered pair where V is a set of
vertices (or nodes) and E is a set of edges (or links). An
edge represents a binary relationship between two vertices.
Graph is a simple but powerful tool for modeling complex
systems. Unique entities of a system form the vertex set V ,
and binary relationships between vertices are represented in
the edge set E. Driven by their simplicity, graph-theoretic
modeling and analysis has been used extensively for cyber
security [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]. Although powerful, graph-
based modeling of cyber systems has limited applicability.
A fundamental limitation of this approach is that vertices
and edges of a graph need to be homogenous in order to
make graph-theoretic analysis meaningful. However, cyber
systems are fundamentally heterogeneous in nature. Graph-
theoretic models are also limited in their ability to capture
the dynamics and physics of a given cyber system accurately.
To further illustrate these limitations consider the follow-
ing situation. An enterprise has access to several different
sources of information such as electronic-mail traffic within
its domain, network flow within and across its perimeter,
events generated by anti-virus software running on individ-
ual computers, and vulnerabilities of individual computers
quantified as a function of the operating system and services
that run on them. Individually, each source provides a limited
perspective on the collective actions of human and software
agents within an enterprise. By focusing on the information
related to a particular user group or a specific software
service, strong correlation or dependencies can be observed
across multiple data sources. Based on an aggregated in-
formation, addressing questions such as: How likely would
host hk get compromised? or Given that host hk has been
compromised, how can we ensure continued operation of a
service si running on hk? will become possible. It is not only
necessary to discover independent local events, but also to
follow the trail of dependencies and discover new events and
vulnerabilities at a global scale. Therefore, we argue that it is
imperative for a cyber system model to encompass different
entities (hosts, users, software processes, and events) and
their diverse interactions (user-host, host-host, host-process,
etc.).
Further, the benefits of modeling a complex cyber system
using a graph-theoretic approach are tremendous. However,
the above definition of a graph can only capture binary
relations between homogeneous entities. It does not provide
a mechanism to distinguish between heterogeneous entities
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and different types of entity relationships. Semantic net-
works [6] and conceptual graphs [7] support the notion of
heterogeneous entities and multiple types of edges. However,
this expressivity comes at a price. For example, consider a
simple breadth-first search on a semantic network to detect
paths between hosts. A multi-hop path not only includes
hosts but may also include other vertex types with specific
rules. Thus, to discover which hosts are reachable in k
hops we need to extend traditional graph-theoretic tools to
incorporate the notion of heterogeneity. In summary, there is
a critical need to extend traditional graph-theoretic models
to successfully model complex cyber systems.
Motivated by the interdependencies between different
critical infrastructure networks, the networks-of-networks
(NoN) model was developed to address some of the lim-
itations of graph-theoretic modeling of single networks [8].
For instance, infrastructure networks such as electric power
grids, communication and control networks, oil and natural
gas pipelines, and transportation networks are all intercon-
nected and interdependent on each other. While each of these
networks can be efficiently modeled and studied individually
using graph-theoretic concepts and tools, the interdepen-
dencies are hard to model in a uniform setting. However,
the inclusion of these dependencies fundamentally alters
our understanding of a complex network, and is therefore
being labeled as the next frontier of network science [9].
Using a two-layered model, Kurant and Thiran [10] made
a distinction between the physical and the logical aspects
of a network. A mapping of the logical network onto the
physical network was then added. This approach enabled
a better modeling of the load on a (railroad) network and
the vulnerabilities caused due to failures in different layers.
Further, the notion of NoN naturally emerges in the context
of cyber-physical systems. For example, the interactions be-
tween a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
network and the underlying power transmission network
that SCADA controls. The connectivity and dynamics of
these two networks are fundamentally different, but the two
networks are interdependent on each other. By modeling
this system as a NoN critical properties and combined
vulnerabilities can be expressed mathematically [11], [8].
Contributions: In this position paper, we propose a novel
three-layered NoN model for an enterprise cyber system
(Section !II). By explicitly modeling the different facets
of a cyber system, our goal is to bring together different
concepts from traditional graph theory and network science
to bear on the problems in cyber security (Section III).
We aim to develop an efficient tool for modeling complex
cyber systems and provide graph-theoretic metrics to express
different functionalities and vulnerabilities of such a system.
While NoN models have been proposed for several cyber-
physical systems, our approach is to apply this model
exclusively for cyber systems, and is thus the novelty of
our approach.
II. A NON-BASED MODEL FOR CYBER SYSTEMS
A. Preliminaries
Mathematically, we represent a network of l networks
as a graph G = (V,E ∪ E′) where the vertex-set V =
V1 ∪ V2 . . . ∪ Vl, and the edge-sets E = E1 ∪ E2 . . . ∪ El
and E
′
= E1,2 ∪E1,3 . . .∪Ei,j , such that Vi ∩ Vj = ∅, and
Ei∩Ej = ∅ for i, j = 1 . . . l. The graph can have weights as-
sociated with vertices and/or edges w : E → R, and can be
directed or undirected depending on the network that is being
modeled. Pair-wise interconnections between two networks
can be represented as a bipartite graph G
′
= (Vs∪Vt, Es,t),
such that Vs ∩Vt = ∅ and an edge always connects a vertex
in Vs to a vertex in Vt. Further, we define an edge e ∈ E
between two vertices (i, j) with its end-points as ei,j where
appropriate. We define a walk in a graph as a finite sequence
of edges (or vertices) W = {e1,2, e2,3, e3,4 . . . ek−1,k} such
that any two consecutive edges in W are adjacent to each
other in the graph. A walk that does not traverse any edge
twice and visits each vertex only once is called a path. We
now briefly present a three-layered NoN model to represent
an enterprise cyber system.
B. Three Layered Model
For the purposes of representing an enterprise cyber
system, we propose a three-layered NoN model, where the
layers are:
• Layer-1: Physical (Hardware) layer,
• Layer-2: Logical (Software; Functional) layer, and
• Layer-3: Social (User; Computer) layer.
This simple model, illustrated in Figure 1, can be fur-
ther extended to include other aspects of an enterprise as
needed. For example, modern telecommunication systems
critically depend on the underlying communication networks
for operation this can be modeled as a new layer. Another
example would be the network of power cables supporting
the communication network, which forms a new layer. We
now provide details on how to model each layer and to build
their interdependences.
The physical layer (Layer-1) is built from the network
topology that is readily available to network engineers and
administrators. This network consists of computers that are
interconnected via switches and routers to the enterprise
backbone. From a graph-theoretic perspective the connec-
tivity of this network is fundamentally different from other
layers. For example, let different workstations (computers)
be represented as vertices, and two computers that can
connected by a certain physical link be represented by
edges. In this representation, all the computers connected
to a switch would form a clique or a strongly connected
component (a path exists from each node to every other
node in the component). If we treat virtual machines as
independent servers (vertices), then all the virtual machines
residing on a physical server would also form a clique.
L1 
P1 
Physical Network: P 
Logical Network: L 
S1 
x 
S2 
Social Network: S 
y 
Figure 1: An illustration of a three-layered (social–logical–
physical) network-of-networks model.
The logical layer (Layer-2) can be built in several different
ways. One simple approach would be to model the different
software applications (services) running in an enterprise sys-
tem as a graph. Here the nodes would correspond to different
services and edges would represent pair-wise relationships
between them. Other approaches such as attack graphs [3]
that describe vulnerability dependencies and system exploits
would also form a network for the logical layer. Similar to
the approach taken by Karagiannis et al. [5], information
collected from analyzing NetFlow [12] data can lead to the
functional relationships between different services. When a
logical network is built to represent different services, the
relationship with the physical layer can be straightforward
services run on specific hardware. On the other hand, if
relationships are not obvious simplifying assumptions can
be made. From a graph-theoretic perspective the connectivity
structure of networks at this layer is different from those at
the physical layer. For example, attack graphs are typically
a collection of directed paths from an attack source to an
attack destination (target computer).
The social layer (Layer-3) can be built in several different
ways. Our goal at this abstraction layer is to capture the
social aspects of a network: How do we find users with
similar activity-profile? How do different users within the
enterprise interact? The interactions among different users
can be collated from several sources such as electronic mail
exchanges, instant messenger communications and possibly
through participation in social networks. Similarly, social
interaction of computers via their Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses can be collated from network monitoring tools
such as NetFlow. Graphs describing behavioral similarity
can be built by clustering the user activities. An edge is
added between two users/hosts if both of them participate
in the same cluster by satisfying a threshold on membership.
From a graph-theoretic perspective such networks have been
studied extensively [13].
In general, social interaction networks tend to have the fol-
lowing structural properties: (i) small-world nature, where
any two nodes in the graph are connected via a short
geodesic path; (ii) large clustering coefficient, where the
neighbors of a node are also interconnected; and (iii) scale-
free nature, where a large number of nodes have a small
degree (number of neighbors) and a small number of nodes
have large degrees. As a consequence, social networks tend
to be vulnerable to targeted attacks but resilient to random
failures.
C. Interactions between layers
Following the work of Buldyrev et al. we use special
edges (dependency links) to connect different networks
between layers [8, 9]. Dependency edges are directed edges.
Further, we make a distinction between dependent and
independent edges. Independent edges represent internet-
work relationships where the node in one network does
not depend on the node in another network for operation.
Independent edges are modeled as undirected (bidirectional)
edges. This distinction will become clear for a given context
and the graph algorithms that are being used, which will be
discussed next.
III. GRAPH-THEORETIC ANALYSIS FOR MISSION
ASSURANCE
Our goal is to study and quantify different aspects of
an enterprise cyber system. Globally at an enterprise level,
we are interested in understanding and quantifying the
collective robustness (or vulnerability) of a cyber system due
to targeted or random failures at different layers (networks).
And, locally at a subsystem level, we are interested in
developing metrics that can be computed from information
collected locally but provide enough information to guide
continuous monitoring and maintenance. The rest of this
section is dedicated to answering the above questions using
the NoN model. We present a number of graph-theoretic
approaches that measure and describe different facets of a
cyber system.
A. Critical nodes and their relationships
Identifying critical components (represented as nodes
and/or edges of a graph) in a network is an important activ-
ity. Many graph-theoretic approaches can be used to identify
such components. For example, betweenness centrality [14]
measures the importance of a node (or an edge) as the
ratio of the number of paths (for example, shortest paths
as described in Section II-A) that flow through a particular
node to the number of all possible paths in the network. If the
ratio is high for a given node then it implies that this node is
critical to the connectivity of the graph. While betweenness
centrality is one of the popular measures, there are several
other variants of centrality that quantify different aspects of
connectivity in a graph [15]. Metrics based on network flow,
nodes along a maximum-flow minimum-cut in a graph, have
also been used in the context of cyber security to identify
critical nodes [2]. In the context of networks-of-networks,
computation of these metrics needs to be adapted carefully.
As an illustration, consider the bottom two layers (logical-
physical) of the three-layer NoN model illustrated in Figure
1. In the logical network, L1 is an important node (since
it controls the flow from the left part of the network to the
right). Similarly, in the physical network, P1 is an important
node. If node L1 is dependent on any node in P , then the
failure of node in P will be detrimental to the connectivity
of the logical network. Therefore, identifying critical nodes
and their interrelationships is an important activity towards
making a cyber system robust.
Quantifying the relationships between critical nodes is an
important next step. Let us assume that we have identified
critical nodes in different layers based on their degree
(number of neighbors) distributions. In the context of a
single network, Newman defined the concept of assortativity
as the association of nodes that are similar in some fashion,
degree for example [16]. Similarly, a network is called a
disassortative when dissimilar nodes get associated with
each other. Assortativity is measured as Pearson correlation
coefficient of the degrees of nodes at the two ends of edges.
The metric is positive for assortative networks, negative
for disassortative networks, and zero for networks with no
specific associations. The notion of assortativity can be
extended to networks-of-networks and provides a critical
metric to gain insight to the interdependencies. Parshani et
al. define this as the joint probability of a dependency edge
connecting a node in the first network with degree j to a node
in the second network with degree k, and call it inter degree-
degree correlation (IDDC). Using simulations and empirical
data modeling a two-lawyer port-airport system, they show
that coupled systems with higher assortativity between layers
are more robust to random failures [17]. While vertex
degrees are important, we need the ability to use other
metrics to define assortativity in cyber systems. The notion
of assortativity needs to be further modified for NoNs where
we might get a zero assortativity when non-critical nodes
in one network are connected to critical nodes in another.
Another closely related metric of interest for us is the notion
of clustering coefficient which can be extended to networks-
of-networks. Local clustering coefficient of a vertex in a
graph is defined as the ratio of the number of actual edges
to the total number of potential edges between all neighbors
of this vertex. Parshani et al. extend this to NoN as the ratio
of the number of neighbors of a node in the first network
that are also dependent on the corresponding neighbors of its
dependent node in the second network. They call this metric
as the inter-cluster coefficient (ICC) [17]. Similar to IDDC,
this metric provides insight on the collective robustness
(vulnerability) of NoN.
B. Reachbility Analysis
Reachability analysis can be a useful tool in determining
the vulnerability of a network. If it is important that a
chosen vertex v in L (in Figure 1) be reachable quickly from
another vertex w also in L, then we can count the number
of shortest paths (as defined in Section II-A) between v and
w in L. However, it might be possible that the shortest path
between two vertices in a NoN model may go through other
layers (consider vertices x and y in layer S from Figure 1).
Disturbances in one layer would result in the loss of efficient
connectivity in the other (the dependent layer). On the other
hand, the fact that there are paths between v and w that
go through L, and paths that go through P can be positive
in the sense that the network as a whole becomes more
resilient. Thus, by suitably expressing reachability across
multiple layers, we can measure robustness as a function
of reachability. Using a single-network approach we used
reachability as a metric to express vulnerability of a cyber
system [18], and plan to extend this approach to multi-layer
networks in our future work.
C. Cascading Failures
A topic that originated in the context of electric power
grids but has found applications in a wide range of networks
is the concept of cascading failures, popularly known as
blackouts in power grids. The dynamics of network failures
can be modeled in several ways. Cascading failures have
been studied using different models under different names.
We will extend a few models that are relevant to NoN
based models of an enterprise cyber system. A commonly
studied topic under this theme is of graph perturbation where
changes are made to a graph and the impact of these changes
is studied [19]. Different metrics can be used to measure the
impact of node (or edge) failures: connectivity of the graph
expressed using the number of disconnected components, or
the size of the largest connected component, or the fraction
of nodes remaining in the largest connected component; flow
in the network; or the overall modifications to the size of the
network expressed via the number of nodes and/or edges.
Another analysis that will be useful for addressing aspects
of cascading failures is optimal security hardening [20]. In
order to protect a system from cyber breaches, all known
weaknesses in a system needs to be hardened. However,
there is an associated cost to this and a fixed budget
dictates which security controls can be implemented and
which weaknesses need to be left unhardened. Thus, first
and foremost, an optimal strategy needs to be determined
that minimizes residual damage (damages due to having
weaknesses in a system) to the NoN that is not perfect.
In order to perform such analysis, we can model the NoN
as a dynamic graph and focus on the degree distribution
of the nodes in the NoN as it changes over time. Of most
importance will be nodes that have high centrality the
higher the centrality the more valuable a node is. Starting
with nodes with high centrality, further node reachability
questions can be asked that will allow us to identify critical
nodes that potentially contribute to cascading failures and
design efficient defense strategies to overcome them. This in-
formation can then be used in a multi-objective optimization
problem [21] that minimizes the total security control cost
as well as minimizes the residual damage. We can constrain
this optimization problem by allowing a maximum degree
of perturbation in the NoN model.
D. Subgraph Pattern Mining
Evidence of a cyber attack can be extracted from specific
signatures expressed as subgraphs or graphlets. Therefore,
the ability to detect and count a large number of signatures
from cyber data is desirable. Detection of emerging patterns
can be used to counter active attacks. Kargiannis et al. use
this approach for classification at the application level [5],
[22]. However, we can use the graphlet degree distribution
(GDD) proposed by Przˇulj [23] as a general metric to study
the existence of patterns not only in the static data but also
to express similarity between two networks.
While the identification of specific signature subgraphs
and graphlets can provide insight into the behavior rep-
resented by the NoN, mining for more general subgraph
patterns and anomalies has shown promise for cyber-security
applications [24], [25]. Incorporating multiple views of the
domain (physical, logical, social) into one graph potentially
allows for the discovery of rich patterns involving structure
from multiple views; however, such approaches would not
scale to the size and rate of change over the entire NoN.
Mining within layers will be more efficient, because an
individual layer is smaller and more homogeneous. But
more importantly, subgraph patterns and anomalies in one
layer serve to focus attention in other layers. For example,
a frequent subgraph pattern in the social layer can be
expanded to include the induced subgraph from the logical
layer to improve understanding of the services supporting
the normative social behavior. Likewise, an anomaly in the
social layer gives us direct links to the related structures in
the logical and physical layers, thus providing an explanation
of lower-level anomalies. And the reverse forensics can link
patterns and anomalies in the physical or logical layers to
the responsible entities in the social layer. The NoN also
improves our ability to mine for patterns in the presence
of dynamics, because change in the structure of one layer
can be processed independently from the change in another.
This allows us to improve graph mining efficiency while still
retaining the connections between layers in order to perform
a more focused analysis of the dynamics in other layers.
IV. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
We proposed a novel networks-of-networks (NoN) ap-
proach for modeling an enterprise cyber system. We claim
that such an approach enables efficient modeling of in-
teractions between heterogeneous entities and yet allows
us to leverage on the traditional graph-theoretic tools. We
presented a novel three-layered model to demonstrate how
the NoN approach can be used for continuous system mon-
itoring and mission assurance. Specifically, we discussed in
depth the following graph-theoretic methods for cyber secu-
rity: (i) detection of critical nodes and their dependencies;
(ii) reachability analysis; (iii) models for cascading failures;
and (iv) subgraph pattern mining. We described how each
of these applications can be built on top of our proposed
NoN model, thus extending the state-of-the-art.
Building a framework to extract each of the unique
networks from Netflow, electronic mail and event logs is the
next logical step for our work. Discovering dependencies
across these networks and developing theories to translate
these dependencies into answering questions on risk man-
agement and mission assurance remain candidates for our
future work. NoN is an emerging novel concept and we
look forward to exciting research in the near future.
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